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Keane: Conceptualizing Civil Society

Introduction
The parameters of civil society have been an issue of contention and debate
since the term was first used in the late seventeenth century.1 Each nation, region,
culture and community has its own view and understanding of civil society and
the role that it plays in daily life. With new left leaning political and economic
models emerging since the 1990s, the definition of Latin American civil society
has also shifted. Presently, in the aftermath of the neoliberal policies, Latin
America is undergoing an ideological shift to the left. The rise of leftist or centerleft regimes in nations throughout the region has had a significant impact on the
space within societies for civil society organizations. This paper will explore how
the shift from neoliberalism to the new left in Latin America is reorganizing and
redefining the space for civil society, particularly non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), and offer insight into the
sustainability of the new left’s policies in this arena. Using the specific examples
from the leftist regimes of Venezuela and Nicaragua, the paper will take the form
of a comparative case study. Responses will be cited from semi-structured
interviews conducted with six NGOs in Nicaragua and Venezuela regarding how
new political and economic models shape these NGOs’ place in society and
operational capacity. Comparing the neoliberal and new left parameters on the
space of civil society provides a clear context for the testimonial results of the
interviews. The paper will then analyze the extent to which the new left’s
definition and organization of civil society space differs from the post-Marxian
definition. The paper will conclude with a critical examination of the
effectiveness and sustainability of the new left’s regulation of civil society,
offering insight as to where Latin American and global civil society is headed in
the future.
Putting a Finger on the definition of ‘Civil Society’
Before delving into the neoliberal and new left conceptualizations of civil
society is it important to develop a working definition of ‘civil society’, and to
understand the historical progression of the term. In Global Civil Society: An
Answer to War, Mary Kaldor traces the evolution of the term ‘civil society’. Her
structuring of the historical ideology of civil society is echoed by many other
academics including Taylor Rupert. The originally the term civil society
described a political community living in a peaceful society governed by laws
consented and agreed upon by citizens.2 In essence, the term distinguished an
established society from the chaotic and unpredictable state of nature that people
would otherwise be living in; the term ‘civil’ society was closely related to
‘civilized’. As Kaldor explains; “civil society is distinguished [during the
1
2
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries] not from the state but from non-civil
societies…”3 Gradually more and more societies began to fit the definition of a
‘civil society’, and the term was in need of redefinition if it was not to be lost
within the definition of a ‘state’. Thus, it was with the emergence of capitalism,
that Marx and Hegel in the nineteenth century modified the meaning of ‘civil
society’ as an “arena of ethical life in between the state and the family”.4 Perhaps
most critical to their use of the term was its ideological contrast with the notion of
the state; civil society became its own entity.
The CIVICTUS Civil Society Index, which conducts thousands of
worldwide consultations on the state of civil society, has sited the
conceptualization of civil society produced by Marx and Hegel as the most
accurate.5 Kaldor argues, however, that the use of the term has continued to
change to the present day. The post-Marxian definition, or what Kaldor refers to
as the ‘activist’ perception of civil society, presupposes the state or rule of law
like Marx and Hegel, and views civil society as “active citizenship” through
“growing self-organization outside formal political circles.”6 Again, civil society
is contrasted with the state, but more distinctly the term is used to emphasize the
possibility through individual or self-organization and political pressure to create
change and influence the conditions of daily life.7 This definition of civil society
evokes the existence of a “global public sphere” for communication and the
growth of transnational organizations and advocacy groups outside interstate
relations.8 Generally the theoretical definition of civil society adheres to the postMarxian or ‘activist’ definition highlighted by Kaldor. The post-Marxian
definition, therefore, serves as a benchmark against which other definitions or
conceptualizations of civil society can be measured.
Nevertheless, any review of literature on civil society will quickly reveal
that no two operational definitions of civil society are identical. The Johns
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project has attempted to bridge this gap
by mapping the contours of civil society in its global survey. The five structuraloperational features that the study revealed as part of the popular definition of
civil society organizations are: 1) organized operations; 2) private or separate
from the state apparatus; 3) not profit-distributing; 4) self-governing; and 5)
3
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voluntary to participants.9 The findings of this study suggest that agreement
exists on only a general outline of civil society organizations. Other leading
academics on the subject of civil society, such as Lester M. Salamon, Helmut
Anheier, and Taylor Rupert, mirror the Johns Hopkins study’s findings by
outlining the same defining characteristics of a civil society organization;
reinforcing the validity of its conclusions.10
The CIVICTUS Civil Society Index (CSI) also conducted a study to reach
a working definition of civil society and found that most countries held that
“groups such as community-based associations, women’s organizations,
environmental groups, non-profit service organizations, independent media, and
social movements ‘belong’ to civil society.” 11 Nevertheless, only 38% of
participants surveyed came to a common conclusion of the types of organizations
that belong in civil society. 12 Clearly, the diversity of initiatives and
heterogeneity of organizations within the civil society arena make studying civil
society on a global scale precarious.
For example, one point of contention is the “trustworthiness” of civil
society organizations. Rupert maintains that the ‘non-distributional’ nature of
nonprofit organizations is viewed largely as an insurance policy of sorts that an
organization is trustworthy.13 In other words, because donors and board members
of CSOs are not receiving benefits from the organizations, their interest in the
program is not a personal one, but rather the very mission the organization they
support. “And it is this ‘non-distributional constraint’ that underpins theorizing as
to why nonprofit organizations have emerged: they do so, it is maintained, in
response to market or state failure.”14 Rupert also cites the importance of the
recent stream of ‘neo-Tocquevillian’ studies focused on how nonprofit and
voluntary organizations, “cast as ‘civil society’, contribute to good citizenship
through creating “social capital.” 15 While many experts eagerly purport the
honorable side of nonprofit organizations and NGOs within civil society, other
experts criticize their role in societies around the world. Many of these criticisms
come from scholars who view civil society organizations and their intentions as a
9
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function of larger forces at work. Therefore it is critical to explore these more
contemporary ideological frameworks of analyzing civil society and what they
offer to the understanding of global civil society as a whole.
Civil Society, Neoliberalism and Globalization
Civil society can be explored through a variety of ideological frameworks.
The popular, post-Marxian definition of civil society gained prominence
throughout the establishment of the neoliberal model or framework; which is
inextricably linked with the process of globalization. This is especially true in
Latin America, where the introduction of neoliberalism went hand in hand with
globalization. Civil society, as the neoliberal model would shape and define it,
can be understood as a function of globalization, or the global spread of
democratic institutions. The neoliberal model, according to Kaldor, promotes
primarily the rolling back of the state, and the spread and strengthening of
democracy.16 Under neoliberalism the strengthening of democracy places a focus
on individualism, and increased political participation.17 At the foundation of
democracy is citizen participation and ‘bottom-up’ policy making where the
people agree upon the laws that guide them.18 Therefore, for the global spread of
democracy to be successful, civil societies need to be created so that citizens can
take control of their lives. According to Kaldor, a healthy civil society is vital to
the spread of ‘substantive democracy’ and the ability of individuals to shape their
own lives and participate in debates about the policies that affect them.19 As
Rupert explains, for Kaldor, civil society is a process “not an end point”, like
globalization and democratization.20
Kaldor traces the spread of democratization from Southern Europe in the
1970s, through Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Central and Eastern
Europe in the 1990s.21 While civil society under neoliberalism and globalization
facilitated political debate and individual participation, this structuring of civil
society also enabled the economic pursuits of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism and
globalization created networks, alliances and relationships between countries, and
increased the frequency of decisions made at the international level. Rupert
confirms Kaldor’s theorizing of civil society under neoliberalism as a function of
western globalization; “usually the third sector is seen as part of – or even a tool
for – the dominant liberal order in Western countries and the global Western
16
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conglomerate of international organizations and global civil society.”22 Vital to
the rolling back of the state, and the neoliberal model’s success, is opening up
markets to global trade.23 The conceptualization of an individual-focused civil
society with many outlets for political participation, molded nation-states into
compatible actors to participate, trade, and interact on an international level;
furthering neoliberalisms ideals.24 Much of Kaldor’s work revolves around the
analysis of the level and quality of democratization that has occurred with
globalization. Kaldor argues the international financial institutions most invested
in the spread of neoliberalism “provide funds to Western NGOs to spread Western
ideals throughout the world.”25 Therefore, while neoliberalism created a large
space for civil society actors such as NGOs and CSOs, the other structural
adjustments that accompanied civil society under neoliberalism caused a
controversial debate over the true intentions of NGOs and nonprofits as promoters
of neoliberal ideals, or impartial actors opening up space for greater civil liberty.
The debate
In the 1980s and 1990s the neoliberal model was both implemented and
adopted by most states in Latin America. At the time, military dictatorships and
authoritarianism dominated the political sphere in a large number of Latin
American countries. 26 The neoliberal model of development challenged the
authoritarian regimes through the implementation of what is known as the
“Washington Consensus.” While neoliberalism undermined authoritarianism in
Latin America, the public’s perception of the nature and role of civil society
became blurred. The resulting consequences and benefits of the market-oriented
model have been open to interpretation, and provide each side of the debate with
their foundations for dispute.
Arguing the affectivity of the neoliberal model, not only for civil society,
but as an effective economic model, Michael Walton (employed by the World
Bank), argues that the structural adjustments imposed by international
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund did
what it set out to do. Neoliberalism opened Latin America to the global market
22

Taylor, Rupert. 2010. Third sector research. Dordrecht: Springer. 16
Walton, Michael. 2004. Neoliberlaism in Latin America: Good, bad, or incomplete? Latin
American Research Review 39 (3): 165.
24
Albrow, Martin, Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, Monroe E. Price, and Mary Kaldor. 2007. 38
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and enabled economic growth, but the preexisting political and social conditions
in Latin America were simply too corrupt and dysfunctional to achieve a higher
level of development.
To reinforce his point, Michael Walton cites positive global trends and
data in his article “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad or Incomplete?”
The Washington Consensus, Walton elaborates, heralded fiscal prudence, trade
liberalization, privatization, a deepening of the financial sector and capital
market-opening, tax reform, and property rights.27 Walton readily admits that
shifts to a greater dependence on markets were usually beneficial, [but] probably
disappointing relative to the expectations of advocates, and certainly incomplete
as a development strategy.”28 Walton also points out in his article an important
distinction to be made within the neoliberal community. That distinction is
between ‘neoliberals’ and ‘neoconservatives’. Neoliberals stand firmly behind
the belief that their structural adjustments and economic reforms will bring about
better conditions for both the country of concern and the greater global
community. Neoconservatives favor globalization “in so far as it benefits the
USA”; they are more deliberate and specific as to the groups, parties, or NGOs
that they support, and always have the US interest in mind.29 Walton clearly
maintains a neoliberal perspective of civil society and therefore discusses the
structural adjustment program modifications and those that are still required for
success. Educational and infrastructural deficiencies, as well as weak institutional
conditions and high levels of inequality, are listed amongst what Walton argues
are the largest hindrances to Latin American development.30
Many of the academics and experts specialized in Latin American politics
and economics that contest neoliberalism’s success in the region also include
within their analysis of neoliberal reforms the positive outcomes that have been
generated. Hagai Katz includes “growth and technological advancement, wealth,
and knowledge…transparent and consequently more accountable” governments,
and finally better communication and sharing of ideas, in his assessment of the
positive outcomes of neoliberalism. 31 Jean Grugel argues that after the
27

Walton, Michael. 2004. Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, bad, or incomplete? Latin
American Research Review 39 (3): 165-183.
28
Walton, Michael. 2004. 165-183.
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Kaldor, Mary. 2004. “Globalization and Civil Society”. In Exploring civil society: Political and
cultural contexts. Edited by Glasius, Marlies, David Lewis, and Hakan Seckinelgin. London; New
York: Routledge 195.
30
Walton, Michael. 2004. Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, bad, or incomplete? Latin
American Research Review 39 (3): 165-183.
31
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introduction of neoliberalism, “democratic institutions have been more stable than
at any other period in the region’s history, civilian government has become firmly
established and the public sphere has been consolidated as a space of a debate and
discussion.”32 The consolidation of the pubic sphere that Grugel references, is the
civil society as defined by Kaldor and Rupert. As Kaldor explains, the neoliberal
model included within its structure the creation and maintenance of a space for
civil society. After all, the spread of democracy went hand in hand with the
opening up of civil society in countries around the world. What is important for
the purpose of this study is to distinguish between the parameters placed on civil
society by neoliberalism, and the perception of civil society organizations as a
part of neoliberalism by citizens in Latin America. At the structural level,
neoliberalism created a space for civil society where organizations and actors
experience a large level of freedom and encouragement in their missions. The
perception of the actors within this space however, has been largely muddled by
the consequences and repercussions of the other neoliberal structures that were
simultaneous introduced along with this conceptualization of civil society.
One perception, which a contingency of Latin American citizens share of
civil society organizations such as NGOs, is that they are a mechanism of
neoliberalism. As part of the neoliberal apparatus, which has had what many
would argue, grandiose detrimental affects on the population, these civil society
organizations, particularly international NGOs, are to be rejected and forced out.
This is a viewpoint that will be further explored with the discussion of the new
left. Many experts argue that the neoliberal model exacerbated the preexisting
social, political, and economic issues, and created new problems for Latin
America. “In the 1970s and 1980s, the failure of the statist model of development,
the drying up of economic aid, and the growth of indebtedness, contributed to
growing disaffection and to demands, often from outside donors, to introduce
democratization measures to legitimize painful economic reforms.” 33 The
‘outside donors’ referred to include the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and are seen by many as the major enforcers of neoliberal political
and economic reform. The seeming focus of these institutions, as perceived by
experts and the Latin American pubic alike, is not on the betterment of the
populations in need of their services, but rather on the maintenance of power and
control of the institutions. Having lived through what Walton calls the
32

Grugel, Jean. 2009. “Basta de Realidades, Queremos Promesas: Democracy After the
Washington Concensus.” In Governance after neoliberalism in latin america. Edited by Grugel, J.,
and P. Riggirozzi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (26).
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“disappointing” results of the neoliberal structural adjustments, many throughout
Latin America have found themselves longing for an alternative to the neoliberal
model. While some nations have remained loyal to neoliberalism, others are
undergoing a shift to more leftist policies and regimes as a resurgence of old
populist tendencies gain strength. The economic reasoning for this desire for a
new model may well be founded, yet the eagerness of many Latin Americans for
a new model may bring unforeseen detrimental changes to the space now enjoyed
by civil society. It is this reshaping by the ‘alternative’ model of the new left, that
this paper will now explore in terms of its ramifications on civil society.
The New Left and the Restructuring of Civil Society
In contrast to neoliberalism which focuses on decentralization of power
and increased reliance on the private sector for goods and services – NGOs and
nonprofits would be included in this sector as outside the state apparatus – the left
and center-left policies bring civil society back under the control and organization
of the state. Prime examples include neighborhood associations and councils.
Goldfrank echoes this trend stating; “whereas the neoliberal model is premised on
a society of individuals competing in the marketplace, the left’s participatory
programs encourage collective formulation and pursuit of goals in a context of
cooperation.”34 What is occurring is an ideological reorganization of civil society,
largely owed to the negative response to neoliberalism, which reduces the power
and influence of NGOs and traditional civil society organizations. Civil society in
Latin America is at a crossroads “between the emergence of a genuine postneoliberal development model that can begin to address the historical problems of
inequality and exclusion, and the resurgence of new forms of populism that are
likely to exacerbate…those same problems.”35 The consequences or benefits of
whichever path countries chose to take will eventually become clear socially,
politically and economically.
Miguel Olivera explains; “the new populists have in common with their
predecessors a strong reliance on mobilizing the masses against internal and
external enemies, as well as on policies of income redistribution through social
programs.”36 Essentially, through the charismatic influence of political leaders
and social elite, a greater level of state control over society is justified “for the
34

Goldfrank. 2009, 43-54
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36
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greater good of the people”.37 This places a strain on civil society organizations
such as NGOs and nonprofits that are viewed as an “outside” force. The space for
civil society is therefore, transformed from one in which NGOs and civil society
organizations can thrive, to one comprised mainly of ‘community’ organizations
dominated by middle and upper class actors.38 According to Benjamin Goldfrank,
the left’s “notion of deepening democracy implies a more responsive, accountable
state and an active citizenry with institutional opportunities to participate in
politics beyond elections.”39 While the left contends that community counsels and
grassroots organizations deepen democracy, through the creation of greater points
of access for the public to voice their concerns; the singular source of regulation
by the state, lends itself to vulnerability for injustice.
Both the neoliberal and new left frameworks for analyzing civil society
and its role within Latin America are valuable to the debate over the extent to
which civil society is being redefined by the new left. Commonly, the two
viewpoints argue that civil society is imperative to the improvement of life for
citizens everywhere. The debate and contradictions between the ideologies arise
when the specific parameters and intended missions for civil society organizations
are analyzed.
It is important to recognize that the public’s perception of an organization
is not always accurate, nor just, especially when NGOs and CSOs are condemned
as mechanisms of neoliberalism. When charismatic leaders with emotionally
grabbing nationalistic platforms point a finger of blame at civil society
organizations, the public is easily swayed. The issue then becomes a question of:
what if? What if the public services and spaces for participation created by
international NGOs and CSOs were removed from the equation? How much does
a country really rely on NGOs and CSOs for support and infrastructure? The rest
of this paper will look into the specific cases of Venezuela and Nicaragua, and
attempt to answer these questions, as well as analyze the extent to which ‘civil
society’ has been redefined in comparison to Kaldor’s post-Marxian or ‘activist’
definition of civil society.

37

Olivera. 2007, 116
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Case Studies: Evidence from Venezuela and Nicaragua
The progression towards left leaning regimes in both Venezuela and
Nicaragua has been a gradual process. Each country has faced its own challenges
and set backs, yet the outcome of each of their distinct histories was the rise to
power of leftist regimes. These are only two cases within Latin America, while
countries such as Bolivia and El Salvador could also be examines as part of the
leftist trend. The shift away from the neoliberal model had begun by the end of
the 1980s and 1990s, as neoliberalism lost “its credibility and its capacity to
provide politically feasible guidelines because it was based on an elitist,
exclusionary pact among small groups of experts and elites representing the
interests of transnational capital.”40 In Nicaragua and Venezuela the door was
open for the leftist ideologies to take root. The preexisting political, economic
and social characteristics of the two countries played a pivotal role in the
development of leftist policies and structures. Throughout the changes to the
political leftist political regimes, the space for civil society has simultaneously
been transformed. The Marxist ideology of Nicaragua’s Sandinista Front for
National Liberation (FSLN), which organized itself during the three consecutive
Somoza family dictatorships, introduced on a party platform leftist policies for the
first time in Nicaragua in 1979. In Venezuela, the process of Hugo Chávez’s
Bolivarian Revolution has “redefined the regional political narrative, introducing
new language of citizenship, rights, participation, cultural pride and
sovereignty.”41
Below, the analysis will first trace the complicated history of
Bolivarianism or Chavismo in Venezuela and its reorganization of civil society.
Following this section, Nicaragua’s historical background will be explored in
terms of the FSLN and Ortega’s consolidation of power and the reasoning behind
diffusion of leftist policies from Venezuela to Nicaragua regarding civil society
space. Exploring the policy changes that have reshaped the space for civil society
in Nicaragua and Venezuela also sheds light on the deviation from the postMarxian or activist definition of civil society.
The Chavismo Space for Civil Society
Hugo Chávez’s reshaping of not only the Venezuelan left, but also of the
space for civil society within the country has taken place over a three-step process.
His Bolivarian Revolution began under the ideology of a moderate social
democracy, then shifted more radically to the left-of-center, and finally reached
40

Margheritis, Ana, Periera, Anthony W. 2007. The neoliberal turn in latin america: The cycle of
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41
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its present state of Twenty-first-century Socialism, or the New Left. 42 The
ideology of the new left has spread throughout the region following Chávez’s rise
to power. “The election of Chávez in Venezuela in 1998 was followed by Lula in
Brazil in 2002…Néstor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003…Tabaré Vazquez in
Uruguay in 2004, Evo Morales in Bolivia 2005…around 60 percent of Latin
America’s population now lives under a government that is in some way, or the
Left.”43 In 1998 Chávez was elected president with an image of the ‘anti-party
candidate’ garnering power and support from a population furious towards the
two parties which had poorly led the country the previous four decades: Acción
Democrática (AD) and the Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (COPEI).44 The
AD and COPEI formed a single-party system through the ‘Pact of Punto Fijo’ in
1957, and shared control of state institutions, and ensured immense political and
economic control for elites within the parties.45 In the 1990s the role of civil
society in Venezuela predominantly manifested itself in protests and numerous
coup attempts against the injustices of Punto Fijo; Chávez led one such protest
himself in 1992.46 By involving himself in Venezuelan civil society activity,
Chávez “resorted to the old Cuban rallying cry of Patria o Muerte, venceremos
(Fatherland or death, we shall overcome!) to promote his Bolivarian Revolution.47
In the first phase of chavismo, Chávez’s focus was against Punto Fijo policies,
and for the promotion of the Bolivarian revolution and regional integration of
Latin America.48 It was through promotion of his positions as anti- Punto Fijo,
that he gained much of his popularity as the new alternative to past parties and
models.49 Using nationalistic symbols of historical figures, legendary heroes, and
national myths, Chávez united the spirit and pride of Venezuela under his
administration.50 “La llegada del Presidente Chávez al gobierno estuvo marcada
por un signo de esperanza y optimismo en buena parte de la población…era el
triunfo de la anti-política en el país.”51 Additionally in this initial stage, civil
society took a more accepted role by the government than in previous
42

Buxton. 2009, 57.
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administrations, as chavismo placed a strong emphasis on “el pueblo” or the
people of Venezuela and policies to improve their living conditions. ‘Plan
Bolívar’ was one of the first policies enacted by Chávez, and tasked the
Venezuelan military with the construction of and repair of community
infrastructure throughout the country; such as school building.52 From the onset
of his leftist policies, Chávez strove to achieve goals with national services and
resources instead of international aid. Punto Fijo created a dependency on basic
food imports, which in turn inspired Chávez to break the cycle of dependency and
reverse it through national integration and rural relocations.53
The second phase of the Bolivarian revolution incorporated a pro-poor
stance on economic and social policy. Anti-neoliberal and anti-united states
sentiments came to the forefront of the policy agenda, and new social programs
strove to provide social and economic rights to the poor.54 The space for civil
society in Venezuela underwent the largest reorganization of the revolution during
this phase through the creation of ‘missions’ around the country funded entirely
by profits from the state owned PDVSA oil company.55 These missions were part
of his pro-poor stance, which was meant to gain him an exorbitant amount of
support. He focused on “salud con servicios médicos cercanos, vendía alimentos
a precios subsidiados, inscribía a las personas de todas las edades en programas de
educación de todos niveles y el Presidente hablaba de la dignificación y
protagonismo de los pobres…” 56 The missions had a variety of functions
including educational initiatives, healthcare provisions, and employment
training. 57 The nationalistic tone of chavismo encouraged “state-to-state”
interactions within these spheres of civil society has provisions, and thus began to
shut out NGOs and CSOs outside of the state apparatus.58 Then in January of
2005, the reorganization of the space of civil society transformed again with the
implementation of ‘Consejos Comunales’.59 Continuing the trend begun by the
missions, state control over civil society space solidified with the installation of
the councils in both urban and rural communities. The highly regulated and
government monitored process of constituting a Consejo required a team of eight
representatives from the Presidential Committee of Popular Participation
educating communities on the purpose, objectives and organization of the
52
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councils.60 All communities hoping to form a committee were required by law to
strictly follow the framework specified by the government.61 “This project of a
new, direct, participatory democracy will replace the previous representative
democracy, which is derided [by Chávez] as formal and false.”62 Within the
councils, community members divided up into work committees staffed by an
elected spokesperson and developed detailed programs for the implementation of
projects agreed upon by citizens of the district.63 Communal banks were installed
in each neighborhood or community to receive funding from the government and
save profits made by council programs.64 The space for civil society, through the
policy changes enacted by Chávez shrank the operational space for NGOs and
CSOs outside of the missions and councils; Venezuela shifted towards a civil
society structured, controlled, and maintained predominantly by the state.
The negative aspects of this shift included the reinforcement of traditional
power relations favoring the elite and a suspicious level of state interaction in
citizen participation within civil society. As Chávez boasted at the 2005 World
Social Forum, his Bolivarian revolution aimed to create a new socialist model to
be spread throughout Latin America.65 “This socialism was to be informed by the
specificities of Venezuela’s historical experience while breaking with the ‘failed’
socialist and communist experiment of the twentieth century.”66 Through the
formation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA)
Chávez spread the “principles of cooperation, social justice and exploitation of
comparative advantage” throughout the region.67 “The state is understood as an
all-powerful institution capable of controlling society.” 68 Nationally, Chávez
consolidated his power by taking control of the National Assembly, PDVSA
management, the military and the national electoral council.69
The United States (US) took notice to these changes in the political
structure of Venezuela and began a series of tactics to limit his power. Anti60
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Chávez forces funded by the US did not succeed, and caused Chávez to “restrict
foreign funding of domestic political organizations and NGOs.”70 Chávez also
shifted to a model of “asymmetrical warfare in response to fears of US invasion,”
and allied with China, Russia and Iran for weapons upgrades.71 Chávez’s power
remained unchecked as oil prices rose, US isolation strategies failed, and leftist
governments rose to power around Latin America. 72 “Resistance against
neoliberalism has fueled the rise of left-wing governments and movements across
Latin America.”73 The stage was set for other civil societies to be redefined and
reorganized under state control and away from being predominantly comprised of
independent CSOs and NGOs.
Further control and restriction of the space for civil society in Venezuela
has included policies intended to suffocate NGOs and CSOs and drive them out of
the country. In December of 2010, Chávez was successful in passing an initiative
called the ‘Ley para la Protección de la Libertad Política y la Autodeterminación
Nacional’. This law limits the receipt by NGOs and CSOs of international
financial support, essentially creating what one journalist called “un muro de
Berlín legislativo”. 74
The following testimonies of three Venezuela
representatives from NGOs focused on advocacy for NGOs, environmental
concerns, and media or press rights. In the interest of the security of these
participants their names, and the names of their organizations will not be used;
rather a numbering system will differentiate the responses.
Interviewee #1:
The first representative who took part in the survey is affiliated with an
environmental NGO aimed at improving the quality of life for Venezuelans
through environmental education and the promotion sustainable practices. While
this NGO is focused in the environment, as the interviewee pointed out, the field
crosses into issues concerning the economy, human rights, and politics. Chávez’s
administration has relied heavily on the environment, particularly oil, to fund its
projects, therefore this organization has “ transformado en una ONG mucho más
estudiosa de la legislación y los derechos humanos…” The interviewee listed a
few of the environmental abuses the government has committed including,
“utilización de la renta petrolera y de otros recursos como oro, hierro, e incluso
70
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extensiones de tierra donde hay bosques o diversidad biológica…” The recent
laws restricting international support to NGOs has placed this organization in high
risk of shutting down. “Nuestra sostenibilidad es dudosa pero vamos a seguir
haciéndolo hasta que podamos…” Beyond the financial restrictions recently
enforced by the new left, the government has been flagged the organization as a
possibly treasonous entity. “Fuimos investigados ‘económicamente’ por el Banco
Central con la excusa de saber como contribuían las ONGs con el producto
interno bruto, cuando somos sin fines de lucro y el historial de nuestras
declaraciones de impuestos así lo demuestran.” This has been a tactic used on
many NGOs and CSOs within Venezuela, and continue to be used as a constant
reminder of governmental control and power. The interviewee goes on stating;
“creo que andaban buscando simplemente encontrar algún lado para justificar el
proyecto de Ley de Cooperación Internacional donde se especifica que podemos
ser traidores a la patria si recibimos dinero o ayuda de otros países…”
This organization works closely with other international environmental
organizations along with groups within Venezuela. Since the government began
its reorganization of civil society the NGO has lost workers who were simply too
afraid of the retribution they would face from the government. “Hemos tenido
perdidas muy valiosas de gente que nos ayudaba y a partir de nuestras denuncias
contra el uso de PVC como material de construcción (proyecto particularmente
liderizado por el propio Chávez) se asustaron y decidieron nos seguir con
nosotros.” In this case their direct attack of Chávez’s use of PVC as a building
material for constructing houses for the poor, led to the loss of the workers who
feared for their lives; “no queremos obligar a nadie a hacer algo que no quiera…”
While this NGO continues its promotion of the education of the public on
environmental issues, they question not only their own sustainability, but also that
of other NGOs throughout the country. “Muchas ONG cerraron sus puertas, otras
internacionales se fueron del país…” The interviewee offered a concrete example
of a reputable NGO, Conservation International, which was shut down for using
the space for civil society actors to promote sustainable environmental ideals.
The interviewee explained that NGOs try to create change through the
public sphere, yet with the passage of the new laws and policies, this is essentially
impossible. NGOs and CSOs across all disciplines are threatened on various
levels; “el primer nivel es la inseguridad que tienen los voluntarios de cualquier
ONG en las zonas más pobres o más necesitadas de la ciudades o centros urbanos,
donde funcionan grupos armados organizados por el propio gobierno como los
“colectivos” pero que antes se llamaban los “círculos bolivarianos”...” Volunteers
and representatives from NGOs face physical harm, or even loss of life in
instances such as the ones mentioned above. On an economic level, organizations
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are losing support from businesses within the country that simply cannot risk
jeopardizing their corporation. At the level of public support and participation in
civil society, there has been a closing of the space and channels for cooperation
and communication. “Hay un cierre de medios de comunicación y muchos
canales que pertenecen al gobierno de turno que ayudan a difundir la idea que los
ciudadanos que pensamos distintos somos peligrosos.” Finally, in respect to the
governments restructuring of civil society organizations, the interviewee states
that organizations known as OMGs or ‘organizaciones muy gubernamentales’
have been created to model the correct forms of citizen participation. These
organizations “con la descalificación personal crean un ambiente muy hostil hacía
nosotros que ha causado agresiones físicas a algunas personas.” The brave
testimony of this representative offers invaluable insight to the current situation in
Venezuela’s civil society. The specific examples of restrictions, abuses and
threats made by the new left and its proponents stand as obvious signs of the
deterioration of civil society space.
Interviewee #2
The second representative interviewed reiterated many of the same issues
and concerns as the first interviewee, highlighting the serious risk of
governmental retribution for organizations and individuals alike. The mission of
this representative’s organization is to defend and promote freedom of the press
and expression within Venezuela. The organizations three areas of interest are;
monitoring of freedom of the press (against attacks, threats, and limitations);
training of investigative journalists; and the promotion of the right of journalists
to access public information as a reporting tool. The vision of this organization
is “ciudadanos venezolanos que ejerzan con mayor conciencia su derecho a las
libertades de expresión e información, posibilitándoles se efectiva participación
en una sociedad democrática.” Therefore, the organization seeks to be “un
referente en la promoción del ejercicio independiente, plural y de calidad del
periodismo como elemento fundamental de estos derechos.” When asked about
their perception of the relationship between NGOs and the government, the
interviewee responded “el gobierno revolucionario supone, en el peor de los casos,
que las organizaciones de la sociedad civil son un instrumento de la conspiración
imperialista en su contra…y que son bolsones de autonomía que obstaculizan la
buena marcha del Plan Simón Bolívar de desarrollo.”
The government is
promoting and operating under the premise the NGOs and CSOs are mechanisms
of the detrimental capitalist or neoliberal model, and therefore must be pushed out.
In place of these ‘neoliberal’ organizations, the government has established,
according to this representative, a parallel system of NGOs “mientras busca
asfixiar a las ONGs genuinas.”
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Similarly to interviewee #1, the second representative’s organization has
been investigated by the government in terms of its financial backing; however,
this organization has also been investigated for its promotion of special
investigative journalism curricula. “Se nos investiga por el desarrollo de un
programa de promoción del periodismo de investigación en universidades
venezolanos, que el propio presidente Chávez ‘denunció’ durante una alocución
publica.” Of the 22 universities that offer degrees in journalism, only one has a
specialization in investigative journalism, suggesting the importance of the
promotion of such a curriculum. After the investigation into the nature of their
educational mission, the NGO was investigated financially for receiving
international funding and support. “Se nos investiga bajo la presunción de haber
cometido crímenes penales como ‘traición a la patria’ e ‘ilícitos cambiarios’…”
In addition to the investigations of this NGO, the organization has been greatly
restricted based on the recent passage of 20 laws in December, including the Ley
de Autodeterminación. These laws have created for this organization, and “la
mayoría de las ONGs que conocemos y los donantes, un clima de incertidumbre y
por lo tanto, paralización.” The arbitrariness of the Ley de Autodeterminación,
allows the government to interpret the parameters of the law as it sees fit;
essentially providing it with the grounds to investigate and shut down any NGO
or CSO it feels threatened by. “Esta ley sólo puso en manifiesto la voluntad del
estado Venezolano por controlar y extinguir a las ONGs.” Within this new law, it
is stated that NGOs are obligated to register with the government “ante un registro
especial de la presidencia de la republica, con la potestad de ratificar (o no) e
carácter de ONGs del registrante.” This process restricts organizations from the
outset as to their missions and receipt of support; without the governments
approval they are essentially paralyzed. The information provided by the
testimony of interviewee #2 not only corroborates the concerns and observations
of interviewee #1, but as a representative organization for other actors within civil
society (particularly journalists and the media), the trends mentioned by
interviewee #2 are well founded. The space for civil society in Venezuela as
perceived by these individuals and the organizations where they work, is
collapsing under the new lefts stringent regulations.
Interviewee #3
The third and final interviewee from Venezuela is also affiliated with an
NGO which represents 49 civil society organizations throughout the country.
“The objectives of the association are the creation and development of knowledge
and the education and encouragement of the action of citizens organized for the
promotions and protection of human rights… to contribute to expanding and
strengthening respect for, and guarantees of, the dignity of persons in civil,
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political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions.”75 Identical to the previous
two representatives, interviewee #3 went into great detail about the restrictions
and obstacles that the laws passed by the National Assembly have created for
CSOs and NGOs in Venezuela. In the words of this representative “the
government is trying to silence the voices of the most outspoken individuals
within civil society.” The intended targets of the governmental restrictions
include “student organizations, labor unions, journalists,” and CSOs. With
advocacy and distribution of information as its core goals, this organization poses
a large threat to the control of the government over civil society, and it’s silencing
of descending opinions.
In a report published by the organization, and included within the
representatives testimonial evidence the laws passed in December of 2010 are
viewed as “illegitimate.” “These illegitimate laws and measures reveal the
absence of checks and balances among the branches of government and the
institutions that safeguard human rights; they demonstrate a precipitous attempt
by the State to impose a system to restructure society that would close the door to
our democratic way of life and exert control over the individual and society as a
whole.”76 The representative further explained that their organization has been
investigated, along with 34 other NGOs under the umbrella of the organization.
The government, again, is looking for any instances that could be deemed
treasonous under the Ley de Autodeterminación, and continues to hold the threat
of penalization over the heads of these organizations. Individuals have been
targeted as examples of what will happen to other civil society actors who speak
out against the government; one individual in particular had to move out of his
neighborhood because of a slanderous commercial aired on the governmentcontrolled television station over 1000 times in one month. The commercial was
comprised of a cartoon of this journalist exiting the US embassy carrying bags
filled with money. This is only one example of the governments harsh
punishment towards individuals its views as a threat. The individual political
actions of citizens are viewed in the same light as activity by political parties;
enabling them to receive the same punishments as parties and CSOs. The same
report goes on to list some of the concrete punishments for ‘violating’ the Ley de
Autodeterminacíon;
“a fine equivalent to double the amount of the resources received in the
case of international funding (art. 6, art. 7), and disqualification from
taking part in elections for a period of five to eight years; a fine from
75
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5,000 to 10,000 tax units for those who provide the economic assistance or
financial support, or who host foreign citizens deemed undesirable by the
government, including their expulsion from the territory (art. 8), and
political disqualification of the president of the host organization for a five
to eight year period (art. 9).”77
The obvious question to be asked of this representative is; provided that
your organizations mission is so controversial and public, does the government
not know what you are doing? And what is the sustainability of your program
once the government begins to target you? The representative responded that “the
government knows we are speaking out, but knows that we are doing so based on
our constitutional rights, this not yet a totalitarian regime, so there is still some
space for civil society organizations.” The consequences of course have been the
investigations and threats of punishment to the major organization and the
majority of its affiliates. Furthermore, in a study conducted by one of the affiliate
programs, using the CIVICTUS Civil Society Index 2009-2010, “con base en 113
organizaciones de diferentes sectores y regiones del país, se encontró que 60%
había experimentado restricciones ilegítimas a su libertad de asociación, estando
entre las más comunes las restricciones de acceso a recursos públicos, la negativa
a obtener información sobre actividades de distintos entes de gobierno, y la
presencia de obstáculos para realizar trámites de registro y actualización de
documentos legales.”78 This is a staggering statistic, and vital to the assessment
of the space for civil society under the new left. The recent regulations have
placed a tangible and quantifiable strain on civil society actors, and in the words
of interviewee #3 are causing a “closing of the space of civil society” in
Venezuela. The sustainability of this representatives organization, its affiliates
and other NGOs and CSOs in Venezeula, interviewee #3 explains, will rely on the
level of creativity they can reach in working together within the country and
abroad to continue their respective efforts. “Its time to work together on
maintaining civil society space.”
All three of the civil society organizations interviewed from Venezuela
readily admit the growing obstacles and challenges their organizations face. With
the rise of Chávez and the new left, came restrictions and regulations that have
redefined the space for CSOs to operate within society. The case of Venezuela is
extremely important to the debate of the extent of change to civil society in Latin
America under the new left, because it is the epicenter of the new left and its
77
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policies are the ones diffusing throughout the region. As the case of Nicaragua
will illustrate, less consolidated and formidable regimes are taking the steps
within their reach to mimic Chávez’s civil society policies. Although the steps
may not be as concrete as an actual law, the ideology behind the actions of
governments such as Nicaragua’s clearly adheres to the new left.
The case of Nicaragua
Space for civil society in Nicaragua has been under immense change, over
the course of resent history. As the country struggled through civil war,
dictatorships, and the establishment of a democratic political framework, civil
society has taken many shapes. During the 43-year dictatorship, the Somoza
regime “repressed autonomous civil organizations and promoted clientelist
mechanisms.”79 Spearheaded by the FSLN, the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty
was due in large part to the grassroots resistance that reclaimed some of the lost
space for civil society.80 The 1980s saw an expansion of the space for civil
society organizations within Nicaragua, as revolutionary sentiments and ideology
with Christian foundations proliferated. “Participation [in civil society] was
underpinned for many people with the ideas of liberation theology, which were
promoted through the Christian Based Communities (CEB).”81 The definition of
civil society that had been growing within Nicaragua since the demise of the
Somoza era, was quickly forgotten, however, as the 1990s began.
In 1989 the FSLN lost power, and with the exit of the party went the
public perception of a civil society built from the ground up. The space for civil
society before 1989 was constructed and maintained by the people in their efforts
to reclaim their country from a horrible autocratic dictatorship. In 1990 Violetta
Chamorro came to power as the president of Nicaragua, largely owing to the
United States-waged Contra War against the Sandinistas.82 The series of rightwing governments that took place in the 1990s marked the introduction of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Nicaragua.83 Rolling back of the state,
rapid increase in the presence of NGOs, and strict economic reform were all part
of the harsh adjustment to a neoliberal model, and created the tendency for topdown policy implementation.84 NGOs were a vital aspect of the neoliberal model,
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in what came to be called the ‘NGO-sation of civil society’ because of their
addressing of poverty, unemployment, and the streamlining of international aid.85
Today international donations are the largest contributors to the
sustainability of NGOS and CSOs in Nicaragua.86 “International aid represents
21 percent of gross national product and CSOs are highly dependent of foreign
aid, which represents 90 percent of most organizations’ budgets.” 87 Recent
statistics from the World Bank offer graphical evidence of the dependency on
foreign aid in Nicaragua; also noticeable is the decline in official development
assistance received over the last five years. The structural role that civil society
organizations and NGOs play in Nicaragua is immensely more critical than in the
case of Venezuela. Lacking the imperative oil revenues enjoyed by Chávez,
Nicaragua is the second most impoverished country in the Western Hemisphere
after Haiti. Nicaragua is “still in early or moderate stages of socio-economic
transition.”88 Political corruption, turmoil, and inadequacy have compounded the
high level of poverty within the country, creating an immense need for the very
services CSOs and NGOs aim to provide.
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In 2000 with the rise of the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) to
presidential office through the Bolaños administration, an opening for
opportunities and growth within the civil society space began. Bolaños distanced
his government from the corrupt practices of his predecessor and in doing so, lost
his party’s backing in the National Assembly.90 Isolated and desperate, president
Bolaños “turned to international donors and civil society to shore up his
legitimacy instead.” 91 For the first time since the neoliberal model was
introduced, NGOs and CSOs felt the Nicaraguan government relax its control on
citizen participation.92
During the near two decades from 1990 to 2006 while the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) was not in governmental power, Ortega was
working to consolidate his own power. The reorganization of civil society is only
one step in a long list of deliberate political decisions that Ortega has made over
the last two decades to ensure his political success. He signed ‘el pacto’ and
pushed it through the National Assembly with his political opponent Arnoldo
Alemán in 1999.93 Within the agreement, after serving a presidential term, a
president is awarded a seat in the National Assembly, and therefore immunity
from prosecution.94 ‘El pacto’ enabled the FSLN and the Liberal Constitutionalist
Party (PLC) to dominate the seats in the Supreme Court and Supreme Electoral
Council, essentially creating a two-party system where smaller parties stood no
chance of gaining office.95 Finally, what proved most imperative for Ortega’s
return to power, the pact reduced the 45 percent lead needed to win an election to
35 percent and a five-point difference between candidates.96 When the votes were
tallied in the 2006 election, Ortega had accrued 37.99 percent of the vote, barely
ten points higher than the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) candidate, Eduardo
Montealegre who managed 28.3 percent.97 Winning the 2006 election, Ortega
began his second term as president of Nicaragua and a New Leftist policy scheme
that changed the space and definition of civil society in Nicaragua.
The time for growth within the space for civil society was short lived in
the Bolaños years, as the FLSN returned to office in 2007. The party’s
90

Howard and Vasquez. 2011, 69
Howard and Vasquez. 2011, 69
92
Howard and Vasquez. 2011, 69
93
Baltodano, Mónica. 2009. Sandinismo, Pactos Democracia y Cambio Revolucionario.
Managua: Fuzión de Colores. 110
94
Staten. 2010, 145
95
Staten. 2010, 145
96
Staten. 2010, 145
97
Close, David. 2009. “Nicaragua: the return of Daniel Ortega.” In Reclaiming latin america.
Lievesley, Geraldine, and Steve Ludlam. (109-122). London: Zed Books Ltd. 117
91

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol1/iss2/3

22

Keane: Conceptualizing Civil Society

“vociferous rejection of NGOs (as opposed to ‘popular organizations’) and lack of
interest in dialogue with organized civil society has significantly changed the
nature of opportunities for CSOs to engage with the state.”98 Organizations of
CSOs such as Participation and Concertation System (CONPES) have been
sidelined by the reframing of civil society under New Leftist policies. 99
Following the new left model, Ortega created by decree ‘Consejos de Poder
Ciudadano’ or Councils of Citizen Power (CPCs) throughout the country.100 The
top-down implementation of civil society policy used to form the councils
exemplifies the ideological influence that neoliberalism has had not only on
political leaders in Latin America, but also on the population which accepts the
decrees. “Over time, the pattern of isolating executive decisions from popular
debate gradually spilled over into other areas of decision-making.”101
Ortega promoted the CPCs like Chávez touting their ability to deepen
democracy and give the pubic direct control over the political decisions that
affected them: or as Ortega put it making ‘el pueblo presidente’.102 The councils
start at the neighborhood level with representatives from the area advocating their
opinions and concerns under the supervision of an FSLN “professional”; in many
cases a local party secretary who can mold citizens’ input into policy proposals.103
While the CSCs certainly create more points of access for citizen participation,
the oversight councils by party representative’s places the legitimacy of direct
communication of interests to the government in question. Initiatives at the
neighborhood committee level are communicated to municipal cabinets and then
to departmental cabinets before finally reaching the national cabinet, headed by
Ortega himself. 104 Beyond opening the space of citizen communication and
participation in the new left’s form of civil society, many CSCs have specialized
functions such as resource distribution.105 However, “these new spaces for citizen
engagement with government represent a challenge to the autonomy of grassroots
organizations.”106 The creation of the CPCs is a direct diffusion of civil society
policy on the part of the Ortega administration; mirroring Chávez’s ‘Consejos’ or
‘Missions’. Hugo Chávez and Muammar el-Qaddafi both redefined civil society
98
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under their leftist regimes through the implementation CPCs.107 The ideology
behind these shifts and reorganizations of civil society space, is that citizen
participation needs to directly benefit the citizen rather than intermediary
organizations such as CSOs and NGOs.108 Therefore, the new organization of
civil society “bypasses existing ‘local governance spaces’ and attempts to reorganize state-civil society relations.”109 “The assumption that the state is allpowerful is linked to the tendency to focus on domestic factors and to treat
external influences as add-ons, exogenous rather than endogenous determinants of
democratic developments.”110
The Municipal Development Committee (MDC), created in 2003, serves
as the arena for dialogue between the government and CSOs and NGOS.111 The
affectivity of the MDC to carry out the maintenance of this channel for
communication has proven less than ideal. CSOs and NGOs in Managua rarely
receive immediate response from the MDC, if any at all, regarding their concerns
and interests.112 Recent newspaper articles explain the lack of response or blatant
ignoring by the government of CSO and NGO concerns.113 CSOs and NGOs in
Managua eventually grew tired of lobbying with the MDC to no avail, and came
together to form the ‘Alliance of Civil Organizations of the Southwest Periphery
of Managua’.114 The Alliance opened up a space for communication within civil
society for organizations to cooperate, and garnered enough power to overcome
the lack of cooperation with the local government.
The power of the Alliance and the amplitude of its voice within Managua
have been largely silenced by the FSLN administration’s creation of its CPCs.115
These community councils now stand as another hoop for CSOs and NGOs to
jump through in order to have their opinions heard by local and national
representatives.
“While the previous government often excluded CSOs
altogether… the CPCs exclude according to party affiliation,” making the space
for civil society an extension of the political party.116
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Since the FSLN’s return to power in 2007, opposing political parties have
faced similar struggles to CSOs and NGOs in terms of funding restrictions. The
Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) leadership has “been targeted by the
government since the FSLN’s return to power with a systematic campaign to
discredit them with accusation of corruption and with attempts to control or cut
off their funding from international donors.”117 “The governance spaces created
by the FSLN are used to channel resources, which provides the state with its own
mechanism for transferring resources to the poor, but which increases
clientelism.”118 The use of CPCs to redistribute welfare resources is compounded
by the fact that “government departments now require a letter of approval from a
CPC before they will consider any requests for resources.”119 Essentially, CSOs
and NGOs are cut off from distributing the supplies donated to them by
international contributors and the government has complete control of resources
and more importantly for Ortega’s consolidation of power, credit for solving the
nations social problems.120 This manipulation of public perception of the Ortega
regime has garnered him support, but has also inspired civil society actors to
change their practices to avoid possible governmental interference. As will be
seen in the interviews from Nicaragua, staying out of the media and traveling
without affiliation to specific programs are a few of the strategies currently
implemented by civil society actors. NGO community Ortega has labeled NGOs
as “reproducers of capitalist values” and attempted to “neutralize” the antiSandinista NGOs and feminist organizations that question his administrations
legitimacy.121
In tasking the government headed councils with the responsibility of
distributing vital resources such as food and basic supplies, the image of Ortega’s
administration becomes one of charity, solidarity and care for the poor. “Why the
president fought so hard for the CPCs can be explained by the chance they offer
him, as coordinator of the national cabinet of the CPC, to present a view of
citizens’ demands that corresponds to his values…”122 Ultimately the illusion of
civil society is painted to satisfy the unassuming public, while the master
puppeteer orchestrates whichever agenda is most important to his political
dominance. Ortega is also hoping that the tension between the executive and
legislative branches over the CPCs and their validity will escalate to a level where
117
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a push for a new constitution is possible.123 In an ideal world for Ortega, a new
constitution would enable him to extend his administration beyond the 2011
elections. The support Ortega hopes to gather through the success of the CPCs is
only one example of the means by which he is creating a charismatic and
politically enticing image of himself.
The Testimonies
The testimonies of NGO and CSO representatives who operate in
Nicaragua describe various tactics Ortega is employing to improve his image to
the Nicaraguan public, and consolidate state control over civil society.
All of the civil society organizations contacted in Nicaragua are non-state
actors with no affiliation to the state-controlled structure of civil society. The
purpose or mission of each organization varies across a spectrum of services
including medical, educational, and human rights advocacy. Each individual
response offered new and unique insight to the space for civil society
organizations within Nicaragua. While Nicaragua, unlike Venezuela, has not
passed any law or decree directly prohibiting or restricting CSOs and NGOs, the
testimonies describe alternative means by which the government has placed
obstacles before the successful operation for many organizations. Each of these
obstacles or challenges directly translate into part of Ortega’s strategy to
consolidate and maintain power; interviewees were well aware of the
government’s manipulation and interference in the space within which they
operate.
Interviewee #1:
The first representative from Nicaragua is affiliated with an NGO focused
on providing medical services, particularly in Managua. The testimony that this
interviewee provided highlights the manipulative nature of the Ortega regime in
terms of civil society. Reiterating the strategy of Ortega to gain support and
popularity throughout the population by taking credit for the successes of civil
society organizations, interviewee #1 explains that they no longer do national TV
interviews that could be spun to appear as part of Ortega’s ‘good deeds’. The
representative goes further in analyzing this scheme of the government by stating;
“Ortega is a dictator, and smart enough to play defense; that defense requires
maintaining public support…One tactic to do this is through creating the illusion
of being a strong supporter or highly involved in the public services that CSOs
and NGOs provide. Another way is to confiscate the resources intended for CSOs
to distribute to the poor, selling some for profit and giving out the rest in a display
123
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of charity.” The final part of this testimony, which refers to the confiscation of
resources, shows how the government can tangibly interfere in the operation of
civil society organizations without the passage of laws. The lack of infrastructure
in Nicaragua, and the unregulated governmental control of the little infrastructure
that does exit (for example the military, police and postal services), enables the
government to punish CSOs without concrete laws or policies. “Shipment of
supplies and resources is always difficult, but the concern amongst NGOs is rising
as more containers are withheld and ransomed by the government…therefore
organizational managers and cite coordinators are constantly looking over their
shoulders for government interference in their work.” Interviewee #1 also added
to this statement that they have made sure not to travel under the name of any
particular organization, so as to not ‘raise any red flags’ and avoid more
‘bureaucracy and red tape’ that would interfere with their operations’ success.
The organization of representative #1 does not receive any funding from the
Nicaraguan government, and relies entirely on international funding. Therefore,
when asked ‘what if Nicaragua were to pass a similar law to the Ley de
Autodeterminación in Venezuela?’, they answered that their program would be
shut down. There would be no hope of sustainability for the CSO, and the
repercussions for the Nicaraguans who benefit from the goods and services of this
medical organization would mean markedly poorer quality care and facilities.
The Ortega administration merely wants to appear to care about the people and
their provision of vital goods and services, while in actuality the only goal of the
administration is its consolidation of power.
The representative of this medical NGO commented on their perception of
the relationship between Chávez and Ortega arguing that Venezuelan oil subsidies
are facilitating and enabling the Nicaraguan governments sustainability. Given
that Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the
government has fewer resources to draw upon for financial stability. Therefore,
“Nicaragua receives subsidized oil from Venezuela, and in turn sells that oil to
national distributors for a profit…the national distributors then sell the oil to the
public, and make a large profit that they use to buy property in Costa Rica.” This
is only one example of the backing that Ortega enjoys in return for his loyalty to
Chávez and the new left. Ortega is essentially given a false sense of security
because of the Venezuelan support he receives, while in reality suffocating NGOs
and CSOs out of the country would destroy an exorbitant amount of the resources
much of the population relies on for survival. In terms of the future of
representatives #1’s organizations; “until they observe physical harm or
imprisonment of members of the organization, the CSO will continue operation in
Nicaragua…The turning point would be when the risks outweigh the rewards;
after all, there are needs in other places too.” The bluntness of this response could
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be echoed by any organization in Nicaragua; if the government continues to
increase its hostility and interference in NGO and CSO operations, the
termination of programs will be the end result.
Interviewee #2:
Within the last year, the Catholic Church in Nicaragua has spoken out against
the Ortega regime and its recent policy changes and “unconstitutional” maneuvers,
particularly within the National Assembly. As a response to the church’s
comments and stance against the increasingly authoritarian regime of Ortega,
Catholic affiliated or based organizations are being severely restricted.
Interviewee #2 is a board member of a Catholic-based organization that operates
in Nicaragua. The information that this participant provided focused upon the
governments withholding by of cargo as the main interference in the CSOs
operation. Like in the testimony of interviewee #1, the government has used this
form of control and penalization as a strategy for halting the operation of this
CSO. The cargo in question contains critical supplies for the organizations
successful operation in numerous Nicaraguan communities. Without the supplies,
the affectivity of the program will be severely hindered, and if such interference
continues, the operational ability of the CSO will stop. “No explanation has been
given for this action, but it is obviously politically motivated and it is meant as a
message” to the organization. There have been a number of articles in the
national newspaper regarding the governmental crackdown on Catholic
organizations. One such article explains that “representantes de la Iglesia
Católica aseguraron que este año han tenido problemas para poder sacar las
donaciones recibidas y llevarlas a los más necesitados.”124 The testimony on
interviewee #2 is certainly part of a trend experienced by Catholic-based CSOs
throughout the country; a trend meant as a warning to other NGOs not to speak
out against the regime.
Interviewee #3
The representative contacted within the third NGO in Nicaragua, quickly
turned down the interview. While there could not be a direct testimony from this
organization, the strong resistance to the interview speaks for itself. This
organization, like the others interviewed in Venezuela and Nicaragua, is
extremely dedicated to its mission, and therefore would not take any steps that
would jeopardize the sustainability of the program. In their explanation for not
partaking in the survey, the representative offered; “You may want to rethink your
paper so that it will not depend on the opinions of Nicaraguans who would be
124
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subject to reprisals.” The demonstrated ability of the government to terminate
programs and place huge obstacles in their path, gives meaning to this response.
The power of the Nicaraguan government is unchecked, like in Venezuela,
and the channels of communication between CSOs and NGOs and the
government are weak at best. Once an organization has been targeted as antiOrtega there is no limit to the lengths the government will go to in an effort to
force the organization out. The three representatives contacted reinforce the
evidence gathered regarding the limited space for civil society in Nicaragua.
While there are no specific laws or regulations on this space, the government has
utilized alternative means of control to consolidate power, and maintain
dominance over the various actors within civil society. The analysis section of
the paper brings the theoretical and ideological implications for civil society space
demonstrated by both the testimonies and historical evidence of the leftist regimes
in Nicaragua and Venezuela.
Analysis: Measuring the deviation of the New Left space for civil society
The activist version of civil society, as posited by Kaldor, is a
radicalization of democracy, which presupposes a state or rule of law, insists on
limitations on state power, and also a redistribution of power.125 Within this
perspective, civil society is synonymous with active citizenship “outside of formal
political circles, and expanded space” where citizens are capable of creating
change through “self-organization and through political pressure.”126 Finally, at a
global level, post-Marxian thinkers conceptualize a “global public sphere” where
transnational communication and advocacy networks can form.127
Considering the space and shape of civil society under the new leftist
regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua, the ideology which seems to best
encompass their structure of civil society is what Kaldor names ‘the postmodern’
version. Civil society in the postmodern conceptualization is an arena of
pluralism where debate and diversity of opinion is welcomed.128 The new left’s
structuring of civil society upon first glance appears to follow this ideology with
its councils and committees for active citizen participation and advocacy for
specific interests. A closer look, however, reveals the exclusionary tendencies of
the new left policies, particularly in relation to NGOs and CSOs as actors within
civil society. Non-state organizations are viewed by the left as an ‘other’ and fear
of the lack of governmental control over such organizations has resulted in the
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rigid policies on the space for NGOs and CSOs within civil society. Venezuela’s
passage of the ‘Ley de Autodeterminación’ in December of 2010, and
Nicaragua’s intervention in the successful shipment and receipt of resources to
many NGOs, stand as clear examples of the new left leaders discomfort and
hostility towards a civil society space which is truly tolerant and plural.
Academics such as Manuel Riesco make sense of the exclusion and
suffocation of NGOs and CSOs, particularly internationally funded and based
organizations, by linking them with the image of neoliberalism in Latin America.
He argues that major events are taking place in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and
elsewhere in terms of transition away from the neoliberal model. “In all these
countries, movements have surged to power which question the neo-liberal model
in a generally radical manner… their achievements are considerable, especially as
regards recovering revenues from natural resources and improving the incomes
and participation of the poor…” 129 While neoliberalism, and certainly
neoconservativism, have been discredited by many throughout Latin America, the
operational space that the neoliberal model creates for civil society actors in
indisputably more expansive and less restrictive than that of the new left model.
Imperative to the understanding of the new left’s momentum and support
throughout the region, is the recognition of the power of the middle class.
Neoliberalism’s causation of the decline in income for middle class employees
(particularly in the public sector) and the cuts in government spending on public
services, health care and education gave rise to the “new poor.”130 The new left’s
mobilization of this population had surmounted to incredible support for “a new
and more active state in defending public goods and public spaces.”131 Kaldor,
like Riesco, addresses the likelihood of populations, such as Latin America’s left,
to view civil society as “Eurocentric; a product of a specific Western culture that
is imposed on the rest of the world.” 132 The anti-neoliberal and anti-west
sentiments that Riesco and Kaldor take into consideration in their analysis of civil
society conceptualization, lead to reformation and redefinition of civil society.
The Venezuelan and Nicaraguan new lefts, like postmodernists, emphasize
“the importance of national and religious identities as well as multiple identities
129
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as a precondition for civil society.”133 Through the structure of the missions and
councils in Venezuela, individuals gain identity not only through their family,
occupation, and religion, but also as a member of civil society who partakes in
decision-making and advocacy. Further highlighting the cohesion of the new left
with postmodernist conceptualization of civil society are the nationalist
tendencies used to enclose the space for civil society. In drawing the boundaries
of the space for civil society around nationality, the new left and postmodernists
seek to separate themselves from foreign or international presences such and
NGOs and CSOs. Therefore, the policies and actions of Ortega and Chávez
would not appear to Kaldor or Riesco as anything other than ‘postmodern’ policy
diffusion.
Kaldor’s activist belief in the limitation of state powers is completely
undermined by the new left’s structuring of civil society as a network of
government monitored channels for communication. Although this redistribution
of civil society space and political power fits into the post-Marxian ideology of
the redistribution of power, the legitimacy of the councils and missions in
Venezuela and Nicaragua is debatable. Post-Marxian or activist thinkers promote
active citizenship, which in some cases is self-organized. The new left could
make the argument that their councils and committees encourage selforganization, yet the strict parameters on the groups, and the need for
governmental approval of community-desired programs undermines the integrity
of the councils. Finally, the global public sphere which post-Marxian theorists
argue is created through the space of civil society, is more of a regional public
sphere under the new left. In Chávez’s concept of the new left and the Bolivarian
revolution, nationalism is expanded to regionalism within Latin America. His
creation of ALBA, promotion of the new left, and political and economic support
pledged by his administration to partners such as Ortega, exemplify Chávez’s
desire to expand the boundaries of cooperation politically, economically, and on
the level of civil society throughout Latin America. “The idea of [regional]
integration is as old as LA independence, which is why it is called Bolivar’s
dream.” 134 While the well founded sentiments behind regional unity and
independence from international actors and institutions that proved detrimental to
development and overall standard of living in Latin America in the past, the
legitimacy of the new left regimes as constructive mechanisms for the
improvement of society and not as strategies for the consolidation of individual
power remains to be seen. The space for civil society, particularly the NGOs and
133
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CSOs, within Latin America is collapsing as new left policies reshape the arena
surround only those organizations and groups constructed, monitored, and
maintained by the state.
Conclusion: Latin America’s Restrictions on Civil Society Space
As civil society is being redefined and reshaped in Latin America, it is
important to understand the sustainability of such organizations. The bottom line
in sustainability is an organizations ability to secure the resources, human,
financial, and technological, that it needs to operate. The Johns Hopkins
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project highlighted the general criteria for
sustainability within its research analysis. First on the list of criterion is a selfgenerated income; through fees, venture activities, member dues, or earnings from
the resources under their ownership.135 Second, and important to the subject of
this paper, is governmental support, which can stabilize the financial base of the
civil society sector.136 Third on the list is popular support, most calculable through
the number of volunteers within the organization. Finally the study cited the
broader policy environment of the societies within which the organization
operates.137 “Especially important here is the legal environment, the set of laws
and regulations governing the operations of civil society organizations.”138
The importance of the analysis of civil society space in this paper is
inextricably linked to the importance or impact that civil society organizations are
capable of having within their respective countries. “The first measurement of the
impact of the civil society sector is the overall contribution this sector makes to
the production of value in the economy.” 139 In developing nations such as
Nicaragua policy makers are faced with the realization that the opportunity for
economic growth is an incredibly powerful incentive for supporting organizations
within their society. In addition to the economic value that civil society
organizations generally contribute to society, the services that they provide to the
population have a major impact.140 Many of the services that the civil society
sector provides to society culminate in the expression and advocacy of public
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opinion, and the drawing in of members and volunteers to promote those opinions
– two other defining contributions of the importance of civil society.141
Venezuela and Nicaragua’s new lefts are at varying stages in their
progression towards complete ‘Twentieth-Century Socialism’. “Neoliberalism,
dubbed capitalismo salvaje (savage capitalism) reached its peak during the socalled “lost decade” of the 1980s, when privatization of public services and
national resources devastated the already highly polarized societies and
economies of Latin America.”142 Presently, the reclaiming and reacquiring of
many Latin American nations by regional forces and powers is gaining
momentum. Chávez has successfully consolidated his power, taken political and
economic control of the country, and reorganized the space of civil society in
Venezuela. As these policies and leftist strategies continue to take shape under
his administration, regional governments within Latin America have begun
employing new left ideologies within their own borders.
In the case of Ortega, the new left proved a critical tool for building his
regime and siphoning power back to the state. The sustainability of the new left
in Nicaragua, particularly its desire to move towards more exclusionary policies
towards international actors is precarious at best, yet the pledge of Venezuelan
economic and political support is arguably the linchpin for success. Importantly,
the reliance on international aid, and the inability for the Nicaraguan government
to provide basic public services to its people, limits the extent to which it can truly
collapse the space for CSOs and NGOs. Venezuela, however, enjoys the profits
from its lucrative natural resources, particularly oil, and is less deterred
economically and socially by the removal of international actors. What is of
concern for Venezuela is the quality of the goods and services that the
government can provide, as well as the authenticity of the space for new civil
society organizations.
On a global level, organizations such as Human Rights Watch reference a
global trend of retaliation towards and resistance of CSOs and NGOs gaining
popularity.143 “National governments forced to contented with an expanding web
of international agreements are less able to control flows of information and
opinion and, in the face of global social norms and pressures, must now take into
141
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account not only public opinions within their borders, but the opinions of external
constituencies as well.”144 Many governments have chosen to retaliate against this
trend in transparency and communication. Censorship, physical abuse and threats,
blockage of funding, harassment, are just some of the tactics employed by
defensive governments in an attempt to deter the presence of CSOs and NGOs.145
As Kenneth Roth explains in the introduction to the 2010 Human Rights Watch
World Report, “one method seemingly in ascendancy is the adoption of intrusive
laws and regulations – designed not to provide a framework to facilitate the
creation and operation of NGOs, but to control and muffle them.”146 Echoing the
trends described in Venezuela and Nicaragua, Roth writes, “the overall trend has
been for States to adopt new laws restricting the space for human rights
activies.”147 Although the report was written in 2010, before the passage of
Venezuela’s ‘Ley de la Autodeterminación’, the initiative was referenced as a
pending restriction on human rights monitoring. The report described the law as
a bill that “would subject NGOs that receive foreign assistance to vague
registration requirements and the duty to answer intrusive government questions
about their activities, funding, and expenses.”148 While the repercussions of the
new left’s organization and control of the space for civil society are yet to be fully
realized, the very fact that citizen participation is being promoted and discussed is
encouraging.
As Latin Americans experience new levels of citizen participation and
continues to learn from their past civil society spaces for advocacy, a future in
which citizens are not “ignorant subservient peasants” or “masses in full transition”
is more likely.149 In fact, within the next few decades, Manuel Riesco argues,
“the vast majority of the LA population will have achieved the status of citizens,
with decent health standards, basic and secondary education of reasonable quality,
and large numbers having completed the tertiary level as well.”150 Only time will
tell the quality and legitimacy of these political, economic, and civil society
advances in Latin America. “The strengthening of South-to-South networks is
imperative if the dominant global structures of power – represented by the USA
and institutions such as the IMF and the WTO (World Trade Organization) – are
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to be challenged.”151 Included in this assessment of the new lefts affectivity is the
extent of the aftermath of exclusionary policies towards international actors and
the space in which they operate. In the mean time, the international global
community of civil society actors continues to fight for its presence and
importance within the borders of the new left countries.
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